The nature of manufacturer's suggested retail prices (MSRPs) and whether their effect is pro-or anticompetitive is not well understood. We exploit a policy experiment in which a ban on MSRPs was imposed and then lifted a year later. We show that average prices increased by 2.1 percent as a result of the MSRP ban and decreased by 3.8 percent when the ban was lifted. We find no indication that MSRPs lowered prices by acting as binding price ceilings and outline an alternative mechanism in which recommendations affect prices by nudging more consumers to search. We demonstrate that recommendations can increase search and reduce prices.
Introduction
Manufacturers often attempt to exert influence over the prices set by retailers. Whether such practices are pro-or anticompetitive is the subject of an active academic and policy debate, 1 as evidenced by the disparate treatment of vertical price restraints in antitrust regulation over time and across jurisdictions. 2 The debate persists in part due to the existence of competing theoretical models that lend credence to both sides of the argument and a scarcity of empirical evidence to determine which theories are supported. 3 In this paper we estimate the effect of a common vertical price restraint, the manufacturer's suggested retail price (MSRP), by exploiting a natural experiment in which a ban on MSRPs was initially imposed and then lifted a year later. In doing so we both identify the manufacturer's motives in imposing this restraint and shed some light on the mechanism by which MSRPs affect prices, which to date has been poorly understood.
The literature on vertical restraints provides several explanations for why a manufacturer may want either higher or lower retail prices. Higher prices and thus higher downstream profits can better align the incentives of retailers to those of the manufacturer, for instance, with respect to the provision of quality-enhancing services (Telser, 1960; Klein and Murphy, 1988) . Higher retail prices may also be part of a collusive upstream agreement, in which vertical price restraints keep manufacturers from engaging in secret wholesale price cuts (Jullien and Rey, 2008) . In addition, higher prices may be the objective of a manufacturer that acts as a cartel leader for powerful retailers. A manufacturer may likewise implement policies to reduce prices. For example, retailers with market power impose an additional margin above the cost they pay to the manufacturer, resulting in lower sales than the manufacturer prefers, an effect known as double marginalization (Cournot, 1838; Spengler, 1950; Mathewson and Winter, 1984) .
These different manufacturer motives have varying implications for welfare. If MSRPs are used to overcome externalities in quality provision or to reduce double marginalization, they likely improve welfare. However, if MSRPs are used to facilitate upstream or downstream collusion, their effect is anticompetitive. Empirical work is then necessary to discern which of the competing theories of vertical price restraints is most relevant in explaining manufacturer price recommendations.
A challenge in estimating the effect of MSRPs, and of vertical price restraints in general, is that their use is endogenous to industry characteristics which are often unobserved (Lafontaine and Slade, 2008) . In particular, the use of MSRPs can be endogenous to unobserved conditions that determine the vertical relationship itself. We are able to address the issue of endogeneity by exploiting an unusual natural policy experiment in South Korea. In Section 2 we outline the policy 1 See O'Brien (2008) for a review of competing theories of vertical restraints since Cournot's (1838) seminal article. 2 In the U.S., the treatment of vertical restraints has changed in the past three decades, relaxing the previous per se prohibition. At the federal level, the 1985 Vertical Restraints Guidelines, issued by the Department of Justice, were permanently withdrawn in 1993. Following the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Leegin v. PSKS, Inc., issued in 2007, all vertical restraints are evaluated under the "rule of reason" approach.
3 Lafontaine and Slade (2008) summarizes the current body of empirical evidence regarding the effects of vertical restraints.
imposed by the Korean government in July 2010, which banned MSRPs on products in several processed foods categories with the stated purpose of fostering competition and reducing prices.
One year later, the government lifted the ban in response to public pressure from consumers. The ban and its subsequent lift afford us the unique opportunity to estimate the effect of MSRPs on prices, while alleviating the concern of endogeneity in the use of MSRPs.
Our data comes from the Nielsen Korea Retail Measurement Service and is described in Section 3. This data set contains monthly prices and sales quantities for 253 products, including products subject to the ban and other similarly priced products that remained outside the scope of the regulation and serve as a control group. In Section 4, we first introduce a specification where only products that reinstated MSRPs after the lift of the ban are analyzed. For this products, the estimates indicate that MSRPs induce prices to decrease by 1.6 percent. We then employ a difference-in-differences approach to estimate the effect of MSRPs when they are removed and then validate these results by observing this experiment in reverse. We find that average prices rose by 2.1 percent as a result of the ban and fell by 3.8 percent as a result of the lift of the ban. In Section 5, we show that the empirical findings are robust across different specifications.
The finding that MSRPs reduced prices suggests that fostering collusion or inducing higher quality provision were not manufacturers' primary motives. On the other hand, our finding is consistent with manufacturers attempting to reduce double marginalization, and in Section 6 we explore this idea further. One potential explanation is that MSRPs act as price ceilings, either explicitly enforced by a manufacturer who punishes retailers for non-adherence or implicitly enforced by consumers that refuse to pay above the recommended price. However, a closer inspection of the distributions of retail prices casts doubt on this explanation. An overwhelming majority of retailers charged prices substantially below the recommended price throughout the sample period, both during times when MSRPs were present and when they were banned. Furthermore, during the times that MSRPs were present, there was no evidence of bunching around the recommended price, and during the ban there was no evidence of an increase in the number of prices above the old recommended price. Although price recommendations impacted prices overall, they did not act as binding constraints.
We propose an alternative explanation of MSRPs functioning as information which affects consumer search. An MSRP may remind consumers of the potential benefits to searching, which nudges a group of marginal consumers to search rather than shopping exclusively at the current store. Using the setting of Janssen and Shelegia (2015) , we show that in a vertical market such an increase in the number of shoppers induces lower retail prices. In particular, we show that the presence of MSRPs results in a leftward shift in the equilibrium retail price distribution. By contrast, a competing theory of MSRPs as reference points for consumer demand predicts changes in prices only in the neighborhood of the recommendation.
In Section 7, we provide a discussion of the main results. Our theory predicts that MSRPs affect prices even when they are non-binding. Empirically, we find a small but negative effect of MSRPs on prices. More generally, by demonstrating that prices are lower in the presence of MSRPs, we provide evidence that manufacturer attempts to influence the downstream market can be pro-competitive.
The Korean ban was intended to reduce prices but had the opposite effect, contributing to its reversal a year later. This highlights the inherent complexity of vertical relationships and the importance of understanding the mechanism behind a vertical restraint in order to construct an effective regulatory policy. Our empirical analysis demonstrates the existence of pro-competitive motives for vertical restraints, yet does not rule out the possibility of anti-competitive motives in other settings.
Background
In this section we describe the main aspects of MSRP regulation and the retail setting in Korea.
The regulation of MSRPs in Korea has a long history and encompasses a wide range of products.
Initially, the Korean government viewed MSRPs as a useful device for informing consumers of a proper price level and left the use of MSRPs at the discretion of the manufacturer. 4 As a result, MSRPs were included on a variety of products, including consumer electronics, clothes, and processed foods. However, by the late 1990's, the Korean government's view of MSRPs had changed. In 1997, the Ministry of Health and Welfare banned MSRPs on cosmetics, hygiene items, and prescription drugs. In 1999, MSRPs were banned from consumer electronics and durable goods, including TVs, VCRs, corded telephones, stereos, and washing machines, and several clothing categories, including suits, children's wear, and sportswear.
Open Price Regulation
In July 2009, the Ministry of Commerce, Industry, and Energy (MCIE) announced the open price regulation with the objective of fostering competition, banning MSRPs from several processed foods categories including biscuits and pies, ice cream, ramen, and snacks. In order to give manufacturers time to comply, the ban was set to start one year after the announcement, in July 2010.
A surprising aspect of this regulation is that it was reversed after only one year. In June of 2011, the MCIE announced that it would allow the reinstatement of MSRPs as early as August 2011. Two factors might have influenced the government's decision to lift the ban for these product categories.
First, there was a general perception that prices for these food items increased after the ban. 5
Second, a March 2011 survey by the Korean Consumer Agency-a public institution that defends consumer interests in Korea-found that retailers did not consistently display prices of several 4 One exception is prescription drugs, for which Article 58 of the Pharmaceutical Affairs Law required pharmaceutical companies to provide an MSRP.
5 ChosunBiz.com reported on June 15, 2011 that prices of snacks, ramen, and ice cream increased sharply after the open price regulation. They reported the price of saewookkang (a snack) increased 16 percent at hypermarkets, 12.5 percent at convenience stores, and 10.4 percent at chain supermarkets. Similarly, HyundaiCapital.com reported on July 7, 2011 that negative publicity over the open price regulation was mainly due to soaring prices and confusion from the absence of MSRPs. They reported that prices in the past year had grown well above the CPI increase of 3.8 percent; in particular, prices increased 7.8 percent for snacks, 10.8 percent for ice cream, and 13.7 percent for biscuits.
products that were subject to the open price regulation (e.g. 21.5 percent of retailers did not display prices for ice cream, 48.8 percent for ramen, and 61.2 percent for snacks). In addition, 93.4 percent of consumers surveyed responded that they felt uncomfortable without MSRP information.
For the ensuing lift of the MSRP ban one year later, two key aspects should be noted. Second, producers decided not to reintroduce MSRPs for some products. At the government's request, producers declared the products for which they intended to reintroduce the price recommendations and the prices they would recommend, listed in Table A-1. 6 The fact that MSRPs were not reintroduced on some products helps us identify the effect of the lift of the ban, which is described in more detail in the next section.
Retail Landscape in Korea
In order to put in context the data, we briefly describe the Korean processed food retail landscape. Table 1 presents the composition and classification of grocery retailers in Korea. The newer distribution channel includes similar retailers to what one would find in a U.S. city, small convenience store chains, supermarket chains where food represents a larger proportion of sales, and large hypermarkets (or mega stores) with a larger product variety. The older distribution channel is composed of supermarkets (bodegas or grocery stores) which are independently owned, and small corner shops. Traditionally, processed food sales were largely through the old distribution channel, but in past decade as the number of supermarket chains, hypermarkets and convenience stores have increased sharply, food sales at the new distribution channel are increasingly important.
Data
The data come from Nielsen Korea Retail Measurement Service and cover 253 processed food products from January 2010 to January 2012. The data contain monthly sales figures and average unit prices across five retailer categories for biscuits and pies, ramen, ice cream, and snacks, which are subject to the open price regulation, and products in cereal and yogurt categories, which are not. Cereal and yogurt products did not use MSRPs on their packaging either before or during the ban, nor after its reversal.
The sample consists of 24,837 product-retailer category-month observations after dropping 7,363 observations due to missing prices or sales data. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of the sample organized by product category. Price levels and dispersion for products subject to the open price regulation (Panel A) are comparable to those products not subject to it (Panel B). Average prices range from $5.53 for ramen to $13.80 for products in the snack category. Average prices were $5.73 for products in the yogurt category, and $10.55 for products in the cereal category. Price dispersion is higher for categories under the policy. The coefficient of variation ranges from 23 to 45 percent for products under the policy and 14 to 21 percent for products not under the policy. Table 3 describes the market structure for each product category. There are between two and five producers in each category, and prices within each category are similar across products and producers. The cereal and yogurt markets are more concentrated than categories affected by the open price regulation. In both categories, two firms control more than 96 percent of the market, as compared to the market share of the two largest firms for categories subject to the regulation, which range from 62 to 86 percent. Also note that these manufacturers operate across multiple food categories, and in some cases the same manufacturer is subject to the regulation in one category but not another. For example, Lotte produces biscuits, ice cream, and snacks; Nongsim produces ramen, snacks, and cereal; and Bingrae produces yogurt and ice cream. Because cereal and yogurt belong to the processed foods industry and have similar prices and market structure, they may constitute a suitable control group. Table 4 presents the market shares and average unit prices of the five retailer categories in each product category. For products under the policy, the market share of each retailer category ranges from 10 to 40 percent with the exception of ice cream category, where the market share of corner shops is approximately 80 percent. The average unit price is lowest at hypermarkets in five out of six product categories and highest at convenience stores in all product categories.
In addition, using the MCIE press release of October 2011 described in the previous section, we identify products under the regulation that included an MSRP after the ban was lifted and which products in the same categories did not reinstate MSRPs. Table 5 presents the number of products in each product category that reinstated MSRPs after the reversal of the ban. This information was released by the MCIE on October 18, 2011, two and a half months after the ban was lifted, and indicates producers' intentions to include MSRPs on products. By this date, producers reinstated MSRPs on 12 out of 49 biscuit and pie products, 18 out of 94 ice cream products, and 9 out of 40 snack products. The MCIE did not provide information on ramen products. Products that did not reinstate MSRPs are used as a control group to estimate the effect of the lift of the ban (see Table   A -1 for a list of products).
We complement this data with the monthly producer price index (PPI) from the Bank of Korea for each of the 6 product categories. 7
7 PPIs for pie and frozen dessert products are separately available from biscuit and ice cream products, respectively.
Manufacturers have the option but not the obligation to include MSRPs on their products, and the variation we observe is in their ability to exercise this option. We are interested in the price effect of MSRPs when they are used, 8 and estimate this using two approaches. First, to alleviate the concern of endogeneity in the use of MSRPs, we focus only on products for which MSRPs are present both before the ban and after the lift. Due to the the unusual nature of these policies in which the ban was imposed and then lifted exactly one year later, we are able to control for the two unobserved factors-the secular time trend and seasonality-without defining any control group. Second, to individually estimate the effects of removing MSRPs and the effects of adding MSRPs, we employ a difference-in-differences methodology first for the ban and then for the lift a year later. For the estimate of the ban, the econometric specification exploits the differential impact on products under the policy with comparable products that were not included in the regulation. For estimates of the ban's reversal, we use both the products not under the policy along with products for which MSRPs were not reinstated as control groups. Comparing the estimated effects of the ban and then of the ban's reversal enables us to test the validity of the estimates, which one would expect to be opposite in sign and similar in magnitude, as well as consistent with the estimates of the first specification.
The Effect of MSRPs
In this analysis we include only the products which had MSRPs prior to the ban and then reinstated MSRPs after the ban's reversal. Our observations are for product i at time (month) t and for a given retailer category; however, for notational simplicity we omit the retailer index in the following specification:
where a dummy M SRP t is equal to 1 if month t belongs to either pre-ban or post-reversal period.
The parameter δ measures the effect of MSRP on price. The x it vector includes PPI for each product category, which captures supply shocks from input prices; and a set of controls for retailer category, month, and product. Lastly, u it are product, month and retailer-specific errors.
In terms of identification, note that our sample data includes pre-ban (January to June 2010), during the ban (July 2010 to July 2011), and after-reversal (August 2011 to January 2012) periods.
Once the seasonality is identified from the period during the ban, the effect of MSRP can be estimated by comparing prices of the same month in different policy regimes. One advantage of this specification is that the effect of unobserved secular time trend on price would average out because MSRPs are used in the first and last six months of our sample period.
To alleviate concerns about the serial correlation of u it , we follow Bertrand, Duflo, and Mullainathan (2004) by estimating the model with clustered robust standard errors, considering a product in each regime (that is, pre-ban, during the ban, and after-reversal) as a cluster allowing an unrestricted variance-covariance structure (see also Donald and Lang, 2007) .
Estimation results in the first column of Table 6 suggest that MSRP lowers prices by 1.6 percent on average. The next five columns present estimates of δ by retailer category. The effect of MSRPs is negative in four out of five retailer categories and significant in supermarket chains and corner shops. These findings indicate that MSRPs reduce prices.
MSRP Ban
Here we focus on just the effect of removing MSRPs and use a difference-in-differences specification for the time period around the initial ban. Let T i denote an indicator variable which takes the value of 1 if a product, indexed by i, belongs to the treatment group, and takes the value of 0 if it belongs to the control group. The treatment group includes products under the open price regulation policy: those in the biscuit and pie, ice cream, ramen, and snack categories. Under the ban, the control group includes products in the cereal and yogurt categories. Af terBan t is an after-the-ban indicator which equals 0 for the period before the ban and 1 for the period when the ban was in place. In our case, we are interested in the effect of the policy on prices P it in the following difference-in-differences specification:
The effect of the MSRP ban is captured by δ, the coefficient on the interaction variable equal to 1 for observations in the treatment group during the ban, i.e. time between the ban was imposed and the ban ended. The x it vector is the same as before including PPI for each product category and retailer category, month, and product fixed effects. Table 7 presents estimates of the overall effect of the ban of MSRPs on ln P it for two different specifications. The first specification uses monthly observations for a window of time starting three months before and ending three months after the ban. The estimates indicate the ban led to a statistically significant, although moderate, 2.2 percent increase in prices. The second specification uses a window six months before and six months after the ban and yields similar results with prices increasing 2.1 percent after the ban.
To see the effect of the ban over time, we use different time windows around the official date of the ban using the specification in Table 7 . Figure 1 presents coefficients of the effect of the ban, starting with a one-month window and increasing the window up to six months before and six months after the ban. For the one-month and two-month windows, the effect of the ban of MSRPs is above 1 percent and statistically significant. For longer time windows, the effects on prices are larger than 2 percent.
In Table 8 we present estimates of the effect of the ban by retailer category for the six-month window. Prices rose by 4.2 percent at supermarket chains and 2.8 percent at hypermarkets. The effects at convenience stores, corner shops, and independent supermarkets are not significant, al- These results are indicative of an overall price increase after the MSRP ban was enacted. One concern is the quality of the control group, since cereal and yogurt products did not have an MSRP throughout the sample period even when the option was available. In the next section, we alleviate this concern by estimating the effect of the lift of the ban using a different control group, namely products that had MSRPs prior to the ban but did not reinstate them after the policy reversal.
MSRP Ban Reversal
In this section we present estimates of the effect of the lift of the MSRP ban. As mentioned above, this policy reversal was announced in June 2011, allowing price recommendations back on products as early as August 2011. The reinstatement of MSRPs was optional and not all manufacturers reintroduced MSRPs on their products. Consequently, products from the same food category are differentially subjected to the treatment of using an MSRP and we use those products that did not reinstate MSRPs as a control group. Figure 2 shows the differential price change of products that reinstated MSRPs compared to products that did not reinstate MSRPs over a time period 6 months prior to and 6 months after the ban reversal. The figure illustrates that across product categories, prices rose by 2.4 to 5.1 percentage points more for products that did not reinstate MSRPs than for products that did reinstate after the lift of the ban.
There are two main distinctions for the econometric specification for the reversal of the ban compared with the specification for the ban. First, the treatment group includes only products that reinstated MSRPs, and the control group includes products affected by the ban that did not reintroduce MSRPs. Second, there is no homogeneous date when MSRPs were reintroduced for all difference-in-differences specification:
Table 9 presents the overall effect of the MSRP ban reversal on prices for our main specification.
The effect of the policy for the three-month window is not statistically significant. This may be due to the fact that there was a short time between the announcement and the effective date of the lift of the ban and most producers' inventories, which did not include MSRPs, had not been exhausted.
The effect for the six-month window is -3.8 percent and significant at the 1% level. We interpret the fact that the effect is absent in the first three months but present in the six-month specification as additional evidence that prices were affected only when MSRPs reappeared on product packaging. Table 10 presents estimates of the reversal of the policy by retailer category for the six-month window. Prices decreased after the lift of the ban in all five retailer categories and its effect is significant for supermarket chains, corner shops, and independent supermarkets. Also, estimates of the lift of the ban by product category presented in Table A -3 show that the effect is significant for all product categories for the six-month window.
The empirical analysis in this section shows that the two opposite policies lead to two effects of opposite sign. In general, this evidence indicates that the presence of MSRPs decreases prices.
Robustness
Endogeneity is a concern in the analysis of the lift of the ban since the use of MSRPs is not randomly chosen but instead determined by producers. In this section, we address this issue by using a matching method and choosing different control groups in the estimation of the lift of the ban.
Bias-corrected Matching Estimator
The choice of including the MSRP on the label is not random in the post-reversal period. Manufacturers would have chosen for which products to put the MSRP back and which products not, based on product characteristics. This non-randomness may lead to the biased estimation of the effect of the lift of the ban on prices. For this reason, we consider matching estimators for average treatment effects. First, we average the data six months before and after the lift of the ban into two periods. Then by subtracting the pre-reversal period equation from the post-reversal period equation, we derive
whereP and P P I are means of price and P P I, respectively. Our aim is to compare the change in the dependent variable, ∆ lnP , of the treatment group and control group. We adopt the biascorrected matching estimators for average treatment effects developed in Abadie and Imbens (2011) .
The identification assumption is that the treatment assignment is random conditional on several observable product characteristics. As for these characteristics, we consider the average market share and sales during the 6 months before the lift of the ban. Equation (1) also suggests that changes in P P I lead to changes in the dependent variable. Consequently, we have 3 matching variables: average market share in the pre-reversal period, sales in the pre-reversal period, and change in P P I. We match each observation with 4 observations that belong to the opposite group based on these observed characteristics. 9 Table 11 presents the average treatment effects for all products and average treatment effects for products in the treatment group only. These results describe the lift of the ban causes prices to drop by 3.2 percent, or by 3.4 percent when restricted only to the products in the treatment group. Estimated average treatment effects range from -0.8 to -6.0 percent across different retailer categories. These results are similar to the previous ones in Table 10 ; that is, -2.0 to -7.0 percent across retailer categories, providing evidence that the lift of the ban decreases prices.
Control Group Selection
In order to further test the robustness of our approach, Table 12 presents estimates of the policy reversal coefficient under different definitions of the control group in the six-month window around the ban's reversal. The first row is our main specification from Table 9 , where the control group includes products under the policy that did not reintroduce MSRPs. In the second specification, we expand the control group to include cereal and yogurt products. The last specification includes only cereal and yogurt in the control group. While the estimated coefficient is negative and significant in the first two specifications, it is positive in the last specification: the estimated policy coefficients are positive for both the ban and lift of the ban when products in cereal and yogurt categories are used as the control group. This might be due to the unobserved heterogeneity in the time trend between the treatment and control group, as they belong to different product categories. Also, the fact that products in cereal and yogurt did not advertise MSRPs either before or during the ban, nor after its reversal (even though they are allowed), supports this idea of unobserved heterogeneity.
The Mechanism behind MSRPs
Having established empirically that the presence of MSRPs reduce prices, we investigate the mechanism behind this effect. We first conjecture that price recommendations act as price ceilings. For example, a manufacturer may punish retailers for exceeding his recommended price by withholding the product in the future or terminating the relationship altogether. Alternatively, the ceiling can be enforced by the behavior of consumers, who use the price recommendation as a reference point (Thaler, 1985; Puppe and Rosenkranz, 2011 ) and hesitate to pay prices above it.
To find support for this theory we take a closer look at the distribution of prices. The Nielsen data set used in the preceding analysis is not ideally suited for this exercise -while it covers a comprehensive sample of products, for any particular product it only provides the average salesweighted price across retailers and not the distribution of prices at the store level. For this purpose we use a secondary data source provided by the Korean Consumer Agency (KCA), consisting of weekly store-level prices for 16 products affected by the MSRP policy at 170 different stores. We use the KCA data here only for qualitative observations. MSRPs reduced prices by acting as binding ceilings. First, note that at each of the three times most prices are far below the MSRP, thus the recommended price is not a binding constraint for a vast majority of retailers. Across the three snapshots, the proportion of prices more than 10 percent below MSRP is 96 percent prior to the ban, 97 percent during the ban, and 98 percent after the reversal. Second, there is no substantial increase in the number of stores charging prices above the recommendation after the ban, and no substantial decrease after the ban reversal. Thus, it seems that the MSRPs do not bind even for retailers that set prices near the recommendation.
We conclude that it is not likely that MSRPs acted as price ceilings.
Recent literature proposes an alternative explanation, which argues that MSRPs are not explicit restraints but instead informative signals. In Buehler and Gartner (2013) , MSRPs are used by a manufacturer to convey information about demand or cost to a retailer. The authors demonstrate that such communication is credible in an infinitely repeated game because there exists an equilibrium in which both firms have a shared objective of maximizing joint profits. In this environment, the manufacturer has no need to exert control over the retailer and instead uses the recommendation to share private information, thereby enabling the retailer to maximize joint profits more effectively. A ban of MSRPs could cut communication between the manufacturer and retailer, and result in the retailer facing uncertainty over market conditions when setting prices, which may potentially lead either to higher or lower prices on average. However, it is likely the manufacturer has means other than the MSRP to communicate with the retailer, thus in practice it is not clear that a ban should have any observed effect.
Price recommendations may also be aimed at consumers, as supported by the fact that MSRPs are often promoted through costly advertising and are visibly printed on product packaging. Lubensky (2016) proposes that MSRPs are a way for the manufacturer to affect consumer search, and demonstrates that if the manufacturer has private information about his costs he can credibly convey this information to consumers via cheap talk. The model's prediction for the effect of an MSRP ban on prices is ambiguous: when consumers are uncertain of the manufacturer's cost, they search too little when the cost is low and too much when the cost is high, and the net effect on downstream competition and retail prices is unclear. 10
Here we explore a different mechanism by which recommendations affect search. We posit that rather than explicitly informing consumers of the returns to searching, an MSRP is simply a reminder that the option to search exists at all, nudging a group of consumers to comparison shop rather than buy immediately at the current store. To fix ideas, consider the setting of Janssen and Shelegia (2015) , with a monopoly manufacturer and two downstream retailers selling to a mass of consumers, each with demand function q(p) = (1 − αp) β and α, β > 0. A proportion λ of the consumers are shoppers who visit both retailers and buy at the lowest of the two prices, randomizing in case of ties. The other 1−λ consumers are non-shoppers, each visiting a single randomly selected retailer. The manufacturer sets a wholesale price w and then two retailers, facing no additional costs, simultaneously set prices.
Suppose that by printing a price recommendation on product packaging, the manufacturer nudges some consumers to shop who otherwise would not have. That is, suppose that without printed recommendations there are λ shoppers and with recommendations there areλ shoppers, with 0 < λ <λ < 1.
We now use existing results from Janssen and Shelegia (2015) and Varian (1980) to describe the effect of price recommendations on prices and profits.
Proposition 1 MSRPs increase the manufacturer's profit and reduce the average retail price.
Proof The increase in shoppers associated with the MSRP has two effects. First, in the retailer subgame, taking wholesale price w as fixed the equilibrium is in mixed strategies, denoted by distribution F (p|λ). Varian (1980) demonstrates that F is decreasing in λ in the sense of first order stochastic dominance. The intuition follows from the retailers' tradeoff -they want to set the monopoly price for their 1 2 (1 − λ) non-shoppers but also want to undercut each other to serve the λ shoppers, and when λ increases the incentive to undercut becomes stronger. With the increase in shoppers induced by the MSRP, for every wholesale price the manufacturer would induce lower retailer prices. results in the second effect on prices, since in principle the manufacturer can increase the wholesale price and consequently push the retail prices back up. However, Proposition 5 in Janssen and Shelegia (2015) demonstrates that for the family of demand functions we consider here, the optimal wholesale price is independent of λ, and therefore the direct effect of lower prices in the retailer subgame remains intact.
While the result in Proposition 1 is derived algebraically for the family of demand functions q(p) = (1 − αp) β , the intuition is more general. It is well-known that the double marginalization price ensues when retailers have full market power, and the monopoly price (which is lower) ensues if retailers have no market power. Since an increase in the number of shoppers λ results in reduced market power for downstream retailers, it stands to reason that retail prices tend to fall as the number of shoppers is increased.
Observe that this theory predicts that the presence of MSRPs results in a smooth leftward shift of the distribution of prices charged by retailers, while the reference point theory predicts a change in prices only in the neighborhood of the recommended price. The empirical evidence in Figure 4 thus seems to point towards the search theory.
Conclusion
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate of whether manufacturers' attempts to exert influence over retail prices are pro-or anticompetitive. We exploit a natural experiment in which a ban of MSRPs was initially imposed and then reversed a year later. We show that average prices increased by 2.1 percent as a result of the MSRP ban and decreased by 3.8 percent when the ban was lifted.
Our empirical finding that MSRPs decrease prices are robust across model specifications.
Our empirical finding also sheds light on the mechanism by which MSRPs affect prices. Since recommendations lowered prices, we rule out theories that MSRPs are used to foster collusion or to maintain higher prices to ensure quality provision. By examining store-level prices, we also cast doubt on the theory that recommendations act as a form of maximum resale price maintenance.
Instead, we propose an alternative explanation in which MSRPs affect the behavior of searching consumers. We show that if by printing a price recommendation on the product packaging the manufacturer nudges some consumers to shop who otherwise would not have, then this results in a leftward shift of the equilibrium retail price distribution. This is in stark contrast with the prediction from the theory that models MSRP as reference points for consumers, which predicts that the changes will occur in the neighborhood of binding recommended prices. The table presents difference-in-differences estimates using ln(P it ) as the dependent variable. The sample includes products under the MSRP ban as the treatment group and cereal and yogurt products as the control group. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. The notation *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level. A three-month window denotes observations from 3 months before and 3 months after the ban (similarly for the six-month window). The table presents difference-in-differences estimates using ln(P it ) as the dependent variable. The sample includes products under the MSRP ban as the treatment group and cereal and yogurt products as the control group. Observations from 6 months before and 6 months after the MSRP ban enactment are used. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. The notation *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level. The table presents difference-in-differences estimates using ln(P it ) as the dependent variable. The sample includes products under the MSRP ban. Products which printed MSRPs after the lift of the ban are in the treatment group, while products which did not print MSRPs after the lift of the ban are in the control group. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. The notation *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level. A three-month window denotes observations from 3 months before and 3 months after the lift of the ban (similarly for the six-month window). The table presents difference-in-differences estimates using ln(P it ) as the dependent variable. The sample includes products under the MSRP ban. Products which printed MSRP after the lift of the ban are in the treatment group, while products which did not print MSRP after the lift of the ban are in the control group. Observations from 6 months before and 6 months after the lift of the ban are used. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. The notation *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level. The table presents average treatment effects and average treatment effects for the treated only. Observations are matched with another four observations that belong to the opposite group on three matching variables -average market share in the pre-reversal period and sales in the pre-reversal period, and change in P P I. The notation *** indicates significant at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level. The table presents policy coefficients from difference-in-differences estimates using ln(P it ) as the dependent variable. Products which include MSRPs after the lift of the ban are in the treatment group. In the first specification, products which did not include MSRPs after the lift of the ban are in the control group. The control group is extended to include cereal and yogurt products in the second specification. In the last specification, only cereal and yogurt products are used as the control group. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. The notation *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level. A three-month window denotes observations from 3 months before and 3 months after the lift of the ban (similarly for the six-month window). The table presents difference-in-differences estimates using ln(P it ) as the dependent variable. Products under the MSRP ban in the sample are sorted into 4 categories-biscuits and pie, ice cream, ramen, and snacks-and each works as the treatment group while cereal and yogurt products serve as the control group. Observations from 6 months before and 6 months after the MSRP ban are used. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. The notation *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level. The table presents difference-in-differences estimates using ln(P it ) as the dependent variable. Products under the MSRP ban in the sample are sorted into 3 categories-biscuits and pie, ice cream, and snacks. For each category, products which printed MSRPs after the lift of the ban are in the treatment group, while products which did not print MSRPs after the lift of the ban are in the control group. Observations from 6 months before and 6 months after the lift of the ban are used. Clustered robust standard errors are in parentheses. The notation *** indicates significance at 1% level, ** at 5% level, * at 10% level.
